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SPREADING THE WEALTH:
INDIAN GAMING AND REVENUE-SHARING AGREEMENTS
STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, PH.D.t
KATHRYN R.L. RAND, J.D.
t t
ALAN P. MEISTER, PH.D.tt*
"Nobody cared about the tribes when they had nothing. Now we're
looking at an era of transformation between Indian governments and
surrounding communities."
-Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation attorney George Formanl
"For [California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger], these [compact]
negotiations are about much more than money .... They're about improving
the lot for communities across the board."
- Schwarzenegger spokesperson Vince Solitto2
I. INTRODUCTION
In little more than a decade and a half, Indian gaming has become big
business in the United States: with nearly $17 billion in revenues in 2003,
tribal gaming accounts for a significant portion of the gambling industry
nationwide, and it continues to grow, nearly doubling in just the past five
years.3 Across the country, thirty states are home to more than 300 Indian
tSteven Andrew Light is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Public
Administration at the University of North Dakota and Co-Director of the Institute for the Study of
Tribal Gaming Law and Policy (http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/NPILC/tglpi/html).
"Kathryn R.L. Rand is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota
School of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for the Study of Tribal Gaming Law and Policy
(http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/NPILC/tglpi/html).
tttAlan P. Meister, Ph.D. is an Economist with Analysis Group, Inc. (ameister@
analysisgroup.com). Nothing in this article is intended to be construed as legal advice or legal
opinions on the part of the authors or Analysis Group. The scholarly opinions relating to law and
policy expressed herein are those of Steven Andrew Light and Kathryn R.L. Rand and do not
necessarily reflect those of Alan Meister or Analysis Group. The economic opinions expressed
herein are those of Alan Meister and do not necessarily reflect those of Analysis Group.
1. Chet Barfield, Indian Casinos Raising Stakes, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 22, 2004, at
Al.
2. James P. Sweeney, 4 Holdout Tribes Offer Alternative Gaming Deal, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 18, 2004, at Al.
3. NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, NIGC ANNOUNCES INDIAN GAMING REVENUE FOR
2003 (July 13, 2004), at http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/documents/releases/pr-revenue_.2003.jsp (last
visited May 14, 2005) [hereinafter NIGC, 2003 REVENUE]. This figure represents all gaming
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gaming facilities operated by over 200 tribes that decided to pursue gaming
as a means of tribal economic development.4
For tribes that have chosen to open casinos, the overriding impetus has
been relatively consistent: socioeconomic adversity. Reservations histori-
cally have exemplified many of the most difficult living conditions in the
United States. Many Native Americans, particularly those residing on res-
ervations, were poor, unemployed, and living in overcrowded and inade-
quate housing in communities with minimal government services.5 Today,
while conditions on many reservations still lag significantly behind those of
other ethnic groups, there have been marked improvements for many
Native American communities, largely due to gaming revenue.6
Indian gaming clearly is a tool of tribal economic development. For
many tribes, gaming is a significant source of government revenue, catalyz-
ing a renaissance of sorts on reservations throughout the United States. But
Indian gaming's beneficiaries are not limited to tribes; non-tribal juris-
dictions benefit from tribal casinos, as well. On balance, states with Indian
gaming operations, as well as the numerous non-reservation communities
located near tribal casinos, have realized extensive economic and social
benefits from tribal gaming operations, ranging from increased tax revenues
to decreased public entitlement payments to the disadvantaged. 7 Tribal
gaming assists states by promoting economic development in under-
developed rural areas while leveraging growth and development in
surrounding non-tribal communities. 8  Increasingly though, states are
operations; that is, Class II (bingo) as well as Class III (casino-style) gaming. We discuss the
legal distinctions among classes of gaming under federal law in Part I!, infra.
4. See ALAN MEISTER, INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY REPORT, 2004-2005 REV. ED. 1 (2004).
5. See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 15-16 (4th ed. 1998).
6. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 6-2 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html (last visited May 14, 2005) [hereinafter
NGISC FINAL REPORT]; see generally STEVEN CORNELL ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING
POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT
STUDY COMMISSION (1998), available at http://indiangaming.org/library/studies/1004-
erg_98rept-tongisc.pdf (last visited May 14, 2005).
7. See generally, e.g., MEISTER, supra note 4; JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, MATTHEW B.
KREPPS, & PATRICK WANG, THE NATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING ON NON-INDIAN COMMUNITIES (2000), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied (last visited May 14, 2005). But cf., e.g., WILLIAM N.
THOMPSON, RICARDO GAZEL, & DAN RICKMAN, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN
GAMING IN WISCONSIN (1995) (discussing negative social and economic impacts of tribal casinos
in Wisconsin).
8. See generally MEISTER, supra note 4; TAYLOR, KREPPS, & WANG, supra note 7; Kathryn
R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5
CHAPMAN L. REV. 47 (2002).
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attempting to acquire a direct share of Indian gaming revenue through
revenue-sharing agreements with gaming tribes.
To some, revenue sharing is political coercion at tribes' expense. The
state simply wields its greater political clout, flouting tribal rights and
federal law. To others, tribal-state revenue-sharing agreements represent
cooperative economic development between tribes and states. The state,
through compact negotiations and state public policy, facilitates successful
Indian gaming within its borders, while the tribe pays the state a "fair
share" of the resulting revenue. We argue, however, that the issue does not
necessarily lend itself to a single, right-or-wrong answer. Revenue-sharing
agreements may be right for some tribes, but not for others. Such agree-
ments are strategic decisions made within a broad and complex context by
both tribal and state actors that have both short-term and long-term
economic and public policy impacts. 9 This article sets forth the necessary
legal and political background to explore the issue of tribal-state revenue-
sharing agreements.
Part II summarizes the key provisions of the federal Indian Gaming
Regulatory Actl0 (IGRA) relating to revenue sharing. Most importantly, in
order to operate casino-style gaming, a tribe must enter into a compact with
the state in which it is located. We also discuss the most significant legal
development since IGRA's passage in 1988: the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida," in which the Court struck
down IGRA's federal cause of action against a state for failure to negotiate
in good faith a tribal-state compact. Seminole Tribe set the stage for highly
politicized compact negotiations. Part III turns to the increasing emphasis
on tribal-state revenue sharing after Seminole Tribe. We describe typical
revenue-sharing agreements in detail and discuss their economic impacts.
To illustrate the political and legal factors that influence revenue sharing,
Part IV examines the highly controversial and widely influential compact
negotiations in California, from the Wilson administration to the recent
agreement reached by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and five success-
ful gaming tribes. Part V offers a number of observations about revenue
sharing and tribal economic development in relation to recent trends in the
law, politics, and public policy of Indian gaming.
9. See generally Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of
Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV.
L.J. 262 (2004); see also STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE (2005).
10. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000).
11. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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II. INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS
As defined by federal law, "Indian gaming" is gaming conducted by an
"Indian tribe" on "Indian lands"-that is, by a federally recognized tribal
government on federal reservation or trust lands. 12 Indian gaming is
fundamentally different than most forms of gambling, from church bingo
nights to the slots at Las Vegas's MGM Grand Casino, because it is con-
ducted by tribal governments as an exercise of their sovereign rights.
Tribal sovereignty, a historically rooted doctrine recognizing tribes' inher-
ent rights as independent nations preexisting the United States and its
Constitution, is the primary legal and political foundation of federal Indian
law and policy and thus, Indian gaming.13
Stemming from the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty, in California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,'4 the United States Supreme Court held
that Indian gaming was outside the realm of permissible state regulation.15
The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians conducted bingo and
card games on their reservations in Riverside County, California. 16 The
games were open to the public and frequented mostly by non-tribal
members.17 Both the State of California and Riverside County sought to
apply existing regulations to the Bands' gaming.18 The lower courts held
that neither the state nor the county had any authority to enforce gambling
laws on the reservations, 19 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 20
First, the Court decided that Public Law 280,21 which grants certain
states, including California, criminal jurisdiction and some nonregulatory
12. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(4), 2703(4)-(5).
13. As noted by numerous commentators, the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty is not the
only understanding of its theoretical or practical meaning. See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE
20 (1997) (asserting there is "a bewildering array of interpretations of the nature and extent of
tribal sovereignty"). Among Indian law scholars, both those accepting of the legal doctrine and
those critical of it, there is relative consensus that tribal sovereignty has both political and cultural
valences. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism:
Where Do Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 358 (2003)
(noting that "Indian nations enjoy both political and cultural sovereignty as an aspect of their
inherent status as separate governments"). In this article, for practical purposes we focus on the
legal and political dimensions of tribal sovereignty in relation to Indian gaming.
14. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
15. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221-22.
16. id. at 204-05.
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 205-06.
19. Id. at 206.
20. Id. at 222.
21. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1162 (1984), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993)).
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civil jurisdiction over tribal lands within their borders,22 did not allow
California to apply its bingo laws to tribal bingo operations because the
laws were regulatory rather than prohibitory in nature. 23 Likewise, the
Court held that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,24 which makes
certain violations of state gambling laws federal criminal violations, did not
authorize states to enforce the federal law with respect to these violations. 25
Finally, and most significantly, the Court determined that federal and tribal
interests in tribal self-determination and economic development preempted
state law regulating bingo operations as applied to tribal on-reservation
bingo operations. 26 This preemption ruling implicitly recognized gaming as
a way to address the economic problems of tribes.27 Cabazon's bottom line
was that if a state did not prohibit a type of gambling altogether as a matter
of public policy, then the state could not regulate that type of gambling on
tribal lands.28
In holding that states could not regulate Indian gaming, the Cabazon
Court "threw the ball into Congress's lap to do something, fast."29 By the
22. In Bryan v. Itasca County, the Supreme Court interpreted Public Law 280 narrowly and
held that a state could only exercise civil jurisdiction to the extent necessary to resolve civil
disputes between Native Americans and private individuals. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). The Court
determined that Public Law 280 did not contain "anything remotely resembling an intention to
confer general state civil regulatory control over Indian reservations," recognizing that "if
Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280 had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory
powers... it would have expressly said so." Id. at 390. Thus, Bryan drew a distinction between
state laws that were civil/regulatory and those that were criminal/prohibitory. See California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
23. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-12.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1984).
25. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 212-14.
26. Id. at 214-22. On this last point, the Cabazon Court stated,
This case also involves a state burden on tribal Indians in the context of their dealings
with non-Indians since the question is whether the State may prevent the Tribes from
making available high stakes bingo games to non-Indians coming from outside the
reservations. Decision in this case turns on whether state authority is pre-empted by
the operation of federal law; and "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." The
inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the
congressional goal of Indian self-government, including its "overriding goal" of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.
Id. at 216-17 (citations and footnote omitted) (alterations of internal quotation in original).
27. Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian
Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711, 718-19 (1996).
28. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 210-11.
29. 1. Nelson Rose, The Indian Gaming Act and the Political Process, in INDIAN GAMING
AND THE LAW 3 (William R. Eadington ed., 1990). One commentator has called Cabazon an
invitation to legislate, because the Court did not hold that the tribes are sovereign and therefore
can operate gaming facilities free of state regulation; rather, the Court balanced tribal interests
against state interests. Jerome H. Skolnick, Alternative Perspectives and Implications, in INDIAN
GAMING ANDTHE LAW, supra, at 140-41.
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early 1980s, Congress had determined that unregulated tribal gaming posed
a problem and, at the time of the Cabazon decision, was in the midst of
debating how best to regulate Indian gaming. A key issue was the state's
role in regulating tribal gaming. The debates were heated; some tribal
leaders voiced fears that state authority over Indian gaming would undercut
tribal sovereignty and generally, therefore, favored a complete ban on
high-stakes gaming rather than acquiescence to state regulation. 30 When
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cabazon, tribal concerns turned.
At that time, tribes expected an adverse ruling from the Court, and ac-
cordingly, some were willing to compromise on the bill.31 Just before the
Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon, Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii),
Thomas Daschle (D-South Dakota), and Daniel Evans (R-Washington)
introduced Senate Bill 555,32 intended as a compromise between competing
interests. On the one hand, the states, along with other non-Native gaming
interests, argued for state control over Indian gaming. On the other hand,
both the federal government and tribes wanted to foster tribal gaming as a
means of reservation economic development and tribal self-sufficiency.
Further, tribes strongly opposed state regulation on sovereignty grounds.
The bill, which struck a balance among these varied and conflicting inter-
ests, eventually was passed as IGRA.
Congress based its enactment of IGRA on the "principal goal of
Federal Indian policy": "promot[ing] tribal economic development, tribal
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 33 IGRA provides that a
tribe can exercise a sovereign right to operate gaming activity if that
activity is not prohibited by federal or state law. 34 IGRA's key innovation
was its categorization of Indian gaming for purposes of regulation. Stated
simply, IGRA allocates jurisdictional responsibility for regulating tribal
gaming according to the type of gaming involved. In so doing, IGRA
establishes three classes of gaming: Class I, or social or traditional tribal
games, which fall under exclusive tribal regulation; Class II, or bingo and
similar games as well as nonbanked card games, which are regulated by the
tribe with some federal oversight; and Class III, or casino-style games,
which fall under the purview of tribal, federal, and state regulation. 35
30. Rose, supra note 29, at 4.
31. Id. Following the Court's decision in Cabazon, some tribes, not surprisingly, opposed
any legislation regulating Indian gaming. Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 501, 505 (1995).
32. S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
34. Id. § 2701(5).
35. See generally id. § 2710.
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Under IGRA, Class III gaming includes all other games not included in
Class I or Class 11.36 These games, typically high-stakes, include slot ma-
chines; banked card games such as baccarat, chemin de fer, blackjack, and
pai gow poker; lotteries; pari-mutuel betting; jai alai; and other casino
games such as roulette, craps, and keno.37 A tribe may operate Class III
gaming on tribal lands only in states that permit such gaming for any
purpose by any person, and, through the compact requirement, the state has
a say in how Class III gaming is regulated. 38
A valid tribal-state compact is a prerequisite for casino-style tribal
gaming. To operate Class III games, a tribe must enter into such an agree-
ment with the state in which the games will be located. This requirement
created an acti e role for states in regulating casino-style gaming within
their borders by both requiring the tribe to negotiate an agreement with the
state and giving the state, along with the tribe, the power to sue in federal
court to enforce the provisions of a tribal-state compact by seeking to enjoin
any Class III gaming activity that violates the governing compact. 39
If a tribe wants to conduct Class III gaming, it first must formally
request that the state enter into compact negotiations with the tribe. Once
the state receives the tribe's compact negotiation request, "the State shall
negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact."40
A compact (and, by logical extension, the negotiations between the state
and the tribe) may include provisions concerning (1) the application of the
state's and the tribe's criminal and civil laws and regulations "that are
directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation" of Class
III games, (2) allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the state
and the tribe "necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations,"
(3) payments to the state to cover the state's costs of regulating the tribe's
Class III games, (4) tribal taxation of Class III gaming, limited to amounts
comparable to the state's taxation of similar activities, (5) remedies for
breach of contract, (6) operating and facility maintenance standards, in-
cluding licensing, and (7) "any other subjects that are directly related to the
operation of gaming activities." 4 1 IGRA expressly prohibits states from
seeking, through a tribal-state compact, to tax or charge the tribe a fee,
36. Id. § 2703(8).
37. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2004).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(B) (2000).
39. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii).
40. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
41. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C). Some states have sought to include in tribal-state compacts pro-
visions not expressly authorized by IGRA, such as restrictions on tribal hunting and fishing treaty
rights. See generally Steven A. Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Do "Fish and Chips" Mix? The
Politics ofindian Gaming in Wisconsin, 2 GAMING L. REV. 129-42 (1998).
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other than the reimbursal of the state's regulatory costs. 42 Under IGRA, if a
state fails to negotiate in good faith, the tribe then can sue the state in fed-
eral court, triggering a specific mediation process. 43 In determining wheth-
er a state has negotiated in good faith, the court may consider the public
interest and public safety, criminality and financial integrity, and adverse
economic impacts on existing gambling interests.44 Notably, IGRA also
requires that the court "shall consider any demand by the State for direct
taxation of the Indian tribe. . . as evidence that the State has not negotiated
in good faith."45
As a compromise between tribal and federal interests on the one hand
and state interests on the other, IGRA's compact provisions reflect a care-
fully constructed balancing of competing concerns. To ensare fair compact
negotiations between tribes and states, IGRA created a mechanism to
enforce the state's duty to negotiate in good faith. As conceived, IGRA en-
courages tribal-state compacts and therefore Class III gaming as a means of
reservation economic development, at least in those states where casino-
style gambling does not violate state public policy.
In its landmark decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,46 however, the
United States Supreme Court upset IGRA's balance of state power and
tribal rights by holding that the Eleventh Amendment's grant of state
sovereign immunity prevents Congress from authorizing such suits by
tribes against states. 47 Thus, the Seminole Tribe Court held that a state
could not be sued in federal court by a tribe under IGRA without the state's
42. Except for defraying the costs of regulation,
nothing in this section shall be interpreted as conferring upon a State or any of its
political subdivisions authority to impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment
upon an Indian tribe or upon any other person or entity authorized by an Indian tribe
to engage in a Class III activity.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4). Additionally, "no State may refuse to enter into the negotiations...
based upon the lack of authority ... to impose such a tax, fee, charge, or other assessment." Id.
Although IGRA does not dictate that a tribal-state compact must provide for state regulation of
Class III gaming, compacts typically have done so. Carole E. Goldberg et al., Amici Curiae Brief
of Indian Law Professors in the Case of Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union v. Wilson, in INDIAN GAMING: WHO WINS? 62 (Angela Mullis & David Kamper eds.,
2000). The tribe retains the fight to concurrent regulation of its Class III gaming, so long as tribal
regulation is not inconsistent with or less stringent than the state's regulation as provided in the
compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(5).
43. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7).
44. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
45. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(Il).
46. 517 U.S. 44(1996).
47. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he [j]udicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
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consent.48 In effect, the Court invalidated Congress's carefully crafted
compromise between state interests and tribal and federal interests.
Without the enforcement mechanism against the states, the states' duty
to negotiate compacts in good faith lacked teeth. In the wake of the Court's
decision in Seminole Tribe, a state effectively could prevent a tribe from
engaging in Class III gaming simply by refusing to negotiate a tribal-state
compact. Indeed, no Class III tribal-state compact was finalized for over
two years following Seminole Tribe, as states took advantage of the Court's
holding.49 For some states that did wish to negotiate compacts, Seminole
Tribe widened the range of permissible compact provisions, including,
arguably, a negotiated state "tax" or "fee" on tribal gaming operations in
the form of revenue-sharing agreements.
III. REVENUE-SHARING AGREEMENTS
As the Indian gaming industry continues to grow, and a few tribal
casinos find extraordinary financial success near the nation's population
centers, an increasing number of states have negotiated revenue-sharing
provisions as part of Class III compacts. In a revenue-sharing agreement, a
tribe commits to paying a portion of its gaming revenues to the state in
exchange for the right to conduct casino-style gaming in the state, some-
times including a guarantee of exclusivity. The Mashantucket Pequots and
Connecticut reached the first revenue-sharing agreement in 1992, in which
the tribe agreed to pay the state twenty-five percent of its slot revenues in
exchange for the exclusive right to operate slot machines in the state.
50
Through the mid-1990s, revenue-sharing provisions were a rarity,
perhaps limited to the nearly unparalleled market of the Pequots' Foxwoods
and the peculiarities of Connecticut's gambling laws.51 Following the
48. Most commentators agree that IGRA's severability clause protects IGRA's remaining
provisions, so that Seminole Tribe invalidates only the tribe's cause of action against the state,
rather than the entire Act. See 25 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) ("In the event that any section or
provision of this chapter, or amendment made by this chapter, is held invalid, it is the intent of
Congress that the remaining sections or provisions of this chapter, and amendments made by this
chapter, shall continue in full force and effect."). But see United States v. Spokane Tribe of
Indians, 139 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that because Congress would not have
enacted IGRA without the tribal cause of action against the state for failing to negotiate in good
faith, the Supreme Court's invalidation of that provision calls into question the entire statute).
49. See Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 427,
430(2001).
50. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-21. Under the terms of the agreement, the
tribe could consent to abrogate exclusivity, as it did to allow the Mohegans to negotiate a compact
and build the Mohegan Sun Casino. Id.
51. When the Pequots first approached Connecticut to negotiate a compact, the state took the
position that although it allowed charities to operate casino-style gaming for "Las Vegas Nights"
fund-raisers, Class Ill games, and especially slot machines, were contrary to state public policy,
2004]
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Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, which coincided with both
steadily increasing Indian gaming profits and state budget crises, more
states, including Wisconsin, New Mexico, New York, and California, have
sought their "fair share" of tribal casino profits.52 Without the ability to
challenge a state's demand for revenue sharing in federal court under IGRA
(unless, of course, the state consents to suit, as has California), the danger
for tribes is that states can simply charge tribes what, in practice, amounts
to a multi-million-dollar fee to conduct Class III gaming, in direct contra-
vention to tribes' sovereign right under Cabazon and Congress's intent
under IGRA.53 At the same time, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe as
a practical matter arguably gave states and tribes greater flexibility in
tailoring compacts to meet individualized needs and concerns. The United
States Secretary of the Interior's position on revenue sharing reflects this
confidence in the "give and take" nature of compact negotiations. Although
IGRA prohibits state taxation of tribal casinos as a condition of signing a
tribal-state compact, as interpreted by the Interior Secretary, tribes can
make payments to states in return for additional benefits beyond the right to
operate Class III gaming.54 Tribes thus have agreed to make "exclusivity
payments," in which they pay a percentage of casino revenues to the state in
return for the exclusive right to operate casino-style gaming. 55
The federal National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) reported that
the Indian gaming industry generated $16.7 billion in revenue in 2003, a
fourteen percent increase over the prior year, while the tribal National
Indian Gaming Association (NIGA) estimated the industry has created
and so Connecticut refused to negotiate a compact to allow the tribe to operate such games. See
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1025 (2d Cir. 1990). The Pequots
sued under IGRA's then-valid cause of action and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, after examining the Las Vegas Nights law, determined that casino-style gaming
was not against Connecticut's public policy, thus obligating the state to negotiate a compact with
the tribe. Id. at 1026-32. Because slot machines were not allowed under state law and were not
specifically addressed by the Second Circuit's decision, Connecticut and the Pequots reached the
revenue-sharing compromise to allow the tribe to operate slot machines.
52. See generally Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House? The Validity of Tribal-
State Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, I GEO. L.J. 451 (2003); Gatsby
Contreras, Note, Exclusivity Agreements in Tribal-State Compacts: Mutual Benefit Revenue-Sharing or Illegal State Taxation?, 5 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 487 (2002).
53. In Cabazon, the Supreme Court recognized tribes' right to conduct reservation gamingfree of state regulation as an aspect of tribal sovereignty. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987). In enacting IGRA, Congress specifically provided that
nothing in the statute should be interpreted "as conferring upon a State ... authority to impose any
tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe ... to engage in a class III activity." 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4).
54. See generally Lent, supra note 52; Contreras, supra note 52.
55. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-20.
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roughly 400,000 jobs.56 In his third annual study on the Indian gaming in-
dustry, one of the authors found that tribal gaming generated $16.2 billion
in gaming revenue and $1.5 billion in non-gaming revenue in 2003. 57
These figures highlight the continued growth of the tribal gaming industry,
representing a twelve percent and sixteen percent increase, respectively,
over 2002.58 Overall, Indian gaming contributed roughly $43 billion in
output, $16.3 billion in wages, and 460,000 jobs to the national economy, 59
generating $5.3 billion in tax revenues shared by federal, state, and local
governments.60
The most direct economic impact of Indian gaming on state and local
governments occurs when tribes make payments pursuant to revenue-
sharing agreements. Current revenue-sharing agreements with state and lo-
cal governments take a number of forms, including percentage payments,
fixed compact payments, impact/mitigation fees and taxes, contributions to
community funds, and redistribution to non-gaming tribes.
61
The majority of revenue-sharing payments are based on a percentage of
gaming revenue. 62 Some tribes pay a fixed percentage directly to the state,
like Connecticut's twenty-five percent take of slot revenue. 63 Other tribes
make payments based on a sliding percentage scale contingent upon vary-
ing criteria.64 For example, as of 2003, California tribes made payments to
the state ranging from zero to thirteen percent of gaming machine revenue
based on number of operational gaming devices, 65 while New Mexico tribes
currently pay three to eight percent of gaming machine revenue, dependent
56. NIGC, 2003 REVENUE, supra note 3; NAT'L INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, INDIAN GAMING
FACTS, at http://www.indiangaming.org/library/index.html#facts (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
57. See MEISTER, supra note 4, at 9. Tribes are not subject to public information disclosure
requirements because of their status as political sovereigns. Reliable data on economic impacts
thus may be difficult for researchers and policymakers to obtain. Accordingly, some have called
for Congress to remove IGRA's exemption from the federal Freedom of Information Act. See,
e.g., William N. Thompson, Economic Issues and Native American Gaming, 7 WISC. INTEREST 5,
5 (1998). Meister's studies of the Indian gaming industry rely on a number of publicly available
data; confidential sources including tribes, casinos, and gaming associations; and economic
modeling. See MEISTER, supra note 4, at 4-6.
58. MEISTER, supra note 4, at 9.
59. Id. at 21. The economic benefits of Indian gaming to states and non-tribal communities
are spurred by tribal revenue-sharing agreements with state and local governments, the economic
multiplier effects induced by gaming revenue, and tribes' charitable and civic contributions. See
generally id.
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id.
62. See generally id. at 22-23.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. Payments are based on machines that were in operation prior to September 1999. Id.
at 26 n.24.
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upon Class III gaming machine revenue.66 In New York, tribal payments
begin at eighteen percent of electronic gaming revenue and top out at
twenty-five percent after the current compact's seventh year.67 A small and
decreasing number of compacts require tribes to make fixed annual pay-
ments to the state; for instance, until a number of Wisconsin tribes renego-
tiated their tribal-state compacts in 2002 and agreed to make payments
based on annual revenue, each of the state's eleven gaming tribes made flat
annual payments. 68
A growing number of tribes have signed revenue-sharing agreements
with local governments, and some also contribute to special community
funds.69 Tribes in Arizona, California, Louisiana, Michigan, and Wash-
ington make payments directly to local governments. 70 After Idaho voters
approved a ballot initiative containing a tribal-state revenue-sharing agree-
ment, tribes agreed to contribute five percent of gaming revenue to local
schools and education programs.71 Tribes in Oregon pay between five and
six percent of net gaming revenue to a community benefit fund.72 Tribes
also contribute to state and local programs seeking to lessen the effects of
problem and pathological gambling. Arizona's tribes, for instance, contrib-
uted approximately $760,000 to the state's Department of Gaming-more
than double the amount contributed by the Arizona Lottery. 73
Depending on the type of agreement and, most importantly, the amount
of gaming revenue tribes realize, annual revenue payments to state and
local governments can add up rapidly, contributing significant revenue to
state coffers. Tribes provided $759 million to state and local governments
in 2003, nearly a one-third increase over the prior year.74 Connecticut
tribes paid the state about $400 million, and California tribes provided
approximately $132 million, while Arizona tribes paid roughly $43 million,
and Michigan tribes provided about $32 million to state and local
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. Although unusual, direct payments to states also come in the form of fees and
taxes. As part of the general requirements for all qualified entities wishing to conduct charitable
gaming in Alaska, for example, tribes pay permit and licensing fees to the state. Id. at 22. Alaska
also presents a special case in terms of taxation. In addition to a fixed revenue payment to the
state if annual revenues exceed $20,000, tribes pay a tax on the cost of pull-tabs and local sales
tax. Id.
70. Id. at 22-23.
71. Id. at 22.
72. Id. at 23.
73. John Steams, Tribes Work to Stem Gambling Addictions, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 19,
2004, available at 2004 WL 84742931.
74. MEISTER, supra note 4, at 22.
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governments. 75 Following a protracted tribal-state compact renegotiation
process, Wisconsin tribes in early 2004 agreed to a five-fold increase in
annual revenue payments to the state, from $20 million to more than $100
million, in return for exclusivity and the ability to operate additional casino-
style games. 76
Clearly, a growing number of states have requested that tribes in-
terested in operating gaming facilities share gaming revenue or have sought
to renegotiate existing compacts or revenue-sharing agreements to provide
larger revenue transfers from gaming tribes. California, in many respects,
exemplifies recent trends.
IV. REVENUE SHARING IN CALIFORNIA
With over 100 federally recognized tribes and some 35 million
residents, California boasts both more tribes and more people than any
other state in the continental United States and, as such, represents a vast
potential market for the continued expansion of Indian gaming.
77 Gener-
ating $4.7 billion in revenue in 2003,78 Indian gaming in California,
conducted by fifty-four tribes, far outpaces other states, earning as much as
a third of the Indian gaming industry's total revenue and ranking
California's total gambling revenue third after only that of Nevada and New
Jersey.79 California, along with Connecticut, also leads the nation in setting
precedents for tribal-state political interactions over gambling, particularly
with regard to revenue sharing. Two gubernatorial administrations, two
ballot initiatives, and two key court decisions resulted in tribal-state
compacts in California with two revenue-sharing provisions. In exchange
for allowing tribes the exclusive right to conduct casino-style gambling in
the state, the tribes agreed to make payments to two funds under then-
Governor Gray Davis's model tribal-state compact. 80 A third gubernatorial
administration under current Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger changed all
that.
75. Id. at 22, tbl.15.
76. Ashley Grant, Tribal Casino Compacts Go Under Microscope, GRAND FORKS HERALD
(N.D.), Feb. 15, 2004, at 4A. At the time of this writing, these compacts were under renegotiation
because a portion of the compacts was deemed unconstitutional by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
See Patrick Marley, Quarter of Casino Payments a Sure Bet, MILW. J. SENT., June 7, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 58823125; see also Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.2d. 666 (Wis. 2004)
(holding that Governor Jim Doyle exceeded his authority under state law in negotiating the
compacts).
77. See U.S. Census Bureau, California Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states
/06000.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2005).
78. NIGC, 2003 REVENUE, supra note 3.
79. MEISTER, supra note 4, at 10, 17.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
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Proposition 5 was a response to then-Governor Pete Wilson's refusal to
include slot machines in tribal-state compact negotiations for Class III
gaming in California. Wilson asserted that slot machines violated the
state's otherwise relatively permissive stance on gambling, a position vali-
dated by a federal appellate court in Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun
Indians v. Wilson.81 Rumsey was quickly followed, however, by a Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision which indicated that state law allowed some
electronic gaming devices, possibly including slot machines with revised
prize systems, thus making Wilson's failure to negotiate over slot machines
a potential violation of IGRA's good faith requirement.82 Wilson then
begrudgingly negotiated a model compact with one tribe.83 Many tribes
found Wilson's model compact unacceptable, however, and decided to take
the issue directly to California voters through the 1998 ballot initiative
Proposition 5, which guaranteed that any tribe in California eligible to game
under IGRA would be allowed to operate certain types of Class III games,
including slot machines. 84
In campaigning for Proposition 5's passage, the tribes faced the well-
funded opposition of Nevada and California commercial gaming interests,
religious conservatives, organized labor, and Governor Wilson.85 The
tribes spent liberally on a public relations campaign couched in terms of
tribal self-reliance and economic development. Following what was at the
time the most expensive voter initiative campaign in United States history
(the tribes spent $63 million while Proposition 5's opponents spent $29
million)86 the tribes successfully transcended party lines in their appeal to
California's rank-and-file voters, as the initiative passed by a two-thirds
majority. The tribes' victory was short-lived, though, as less than a year af-
ter its passage, the California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 5 on
the ground that it authorized Las Vegas-style casinos in violation of a state
constitutional provision prohibiting the type of casinos "currently found in
Nevada and New Jersey."87
81. 64 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1994).
82. See Chad M. Gordon, From Hope to Realization of Dreams: Proposition 5 andCalifornia Indian Gaming, in INDIAN GAMING: WHO WINS?, supra note 42, at 7-8; see alsoWestern Telcon, Inc. v. Cal. State Lottery, 917 P.2d 651 (1996) (interpreting "lottery" under state
law).
83. Gordon, supra note 82, at 5.
84. See id. at 6-7. Posited as a "win-win" for Native Americans and non-tribal members
alike, Proposition 5 required gaming tribes to share revenue with non-gaming tribes, reimburse the
state for the regulatory costs of gaming, and fund the establishment of statewide emergency
services. Id.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 1000 (1999).
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Yet the November election had ushered in more than just Proposition
5: Democrat Gray Davis was elected as California's new governor.
88 Sup-
ported by many tribes, who contributed more than $1 million to Davis's
1998 election and 2002 reelection efforts, Davis quickly drafted a model
gaming compact that largely tracked Proposition 5's terms. 89 Widespread
tribal acceptance of this model compact, however, was conditioned on the
passage of Proposition IA, a voter initiative that would amend the state
constitution to exempt tribes from the prohibition on Las Vegas-style casi-
nos in California. 9° California voters revalidated their support for tribal
gaming by approving Proposition IA in 2000.91
Under the newly authorized Davis compacts, tribes agreed to make
payments to two funds. The first of these, the Special Distribution Fund, is
available for appropriation by the state legislature for a number of gaming-
related purposes 92 and essentially is a limited-purpose revenue-sharing
agreement with the state. Under the terms of the model compact, tribes pay
a graduated percentage of gaming machine revenue, up to thirteen percent,
based on the number of machines operated by the tribe prior to September
1999.93 In one of the few court cases addressing the legality of tribal-state
revenue-sharing agreements,94 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the restrictions on the state legislature's use of the
tribal gaming revenue and the bargained-for tribal exclusivity over casino-
style gaming sufficiently complied with both IGRA and congressional
intent: "We do not find it inimical to the purpose or design of IGRA for the
State, under these circumstances, to ask for a reasonable share of tribal
gaming revenues . . . ."95
88. In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003).
89. See Gordon, supra note 82, at 9-10; see also In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at
1094 (describing history of compact negotiations in California).
90. Gordon, supra note 82, at 10.
91. See In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1103.
92. The Special Distribution Fund may be used for,
(a) grants for programs designed to address gambling addiction; (b) grants for the
support of state and local government agencies impacted by tribal gaming; (c)
compensation for regulating costs incurred by the State Gaming Agency and the state
Department of Justice in connection with the implementation and administration of the
compact; (d) payment of shortfalls that may occur in the [Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund, discussed below[; and (e) any other purposes specified by the legislature.
Id. at 1106. As construed by the federal court, the last provision is limited to any other purposes
"directly related to gaming." Id.
93. Id.
94. Earlier in the protracted litigation over Indian gaming in California, the state had
consented to suit, waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity under Seminole Tribe and thus
allowing the federal court to hear the issue. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v.
Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1255 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994).
95. In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 1115.
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The second fund into which the tribes are required to pay is the
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund.96 This fund is unique in that it established
"tribe-to-tribe" revenue sharing.97 Tribes pay a per-machine licensing fee
into the fund. The fee structure ranges from $900 to $4,350 per machine
annually, depending on the number of slot machines operated by the tribe.98
For a tribe operating 2,000 slot machines prior to September 1999, the
maximum number of machines allowed under the model compact, the
licensing fee would be just under $4.6 million each year. With the fees paid
into the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, each non-gaming tribe in California
is paid up to $1.1 million each year.99 In 2003, gaming tribes in California
paid about $130 million into the two funds.100
Indian gaming under the Davis compacts appeared secure for at least
the next two decades, the minimum duration of the model compact.101 Butjust two years later, faced with a budget shortfall of nearly $35 billion,
Davis proposed renegotiating the tribal-state compacts.102 Looking to
examples like Connecticut, where the state's two tribal casinos pay the state
an estimated $400 million per year, and perhaps conscious of the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in upholding the Special Distribution Fund, Davis
offered to consider increasing the maximum number of slot machines a
tribe could operate at its casinos in exchange for annual revenue payments
96. ld. at 1111.
97. California's novel "tribe-to-tribe" revenue sharing requirement has been lauded as a way
to spread the wealth of the Indian gaming industry more equitably among all tribes. See id.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the provision advances the congressional goal of promoting tribal
economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments "by creating a
-mechanism whereby all of California's tribes-not just those fortunate enough to have landlocated in populous or accessible areas-can benefit from class Ill gaming activities in the state."
Id. Others, however, see the provision as an infringement of tribal sovereignty, akin to requiring
California to share its tax revenue with Nevada. As to the wide variation in tribal casino
profitability, former NIGA chair Rick Hill asked, "Would it be any surprise that the
Massachusetts Lottery generates more revenue than the New Mexico Lottery?" Rick Hill, Letter
to the Editor [of the Boston Globe] (Dec. 20, 2000), www.indiangaming.org/info/
bostonglobe.shtml (on file with the authors).
98. For the first 350 machines, there is no license fee; for the next 400 machines, the license
fee is $900 per year per machine; for the next 500 machines, the fee is $1,950 per year per
machine; for the next 750 machines, the fee is $4,350 per year per machine. TRIBAL-STATE
GAMING COMPACT, MODEL COMPACT FOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA, available at http://
www.cfk.com/final%20compact.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). The number of slots any one
tribe may operate is capped at 2,000. Id.
99. In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at 105.
100. See MEISTER, supra note 4, at 22, tbl. 15.
101. See generally In re Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (describing history of
compact negotiations in California).
102. Eric Bailey & Jeffrey L. Rabin, The Recall Campaign: Casinos Bet on Bustamonte and
McClintock, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at A17; Glenn F. Bunting & Dan Morain, Tribes Take a
Wait-and-See Recall Stance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003.
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to the state of $1.5 billion.103 Davis also required tribes entering into new
compacts to agree to make payments directly to the state treasury, by-
passing the use limitations of the model compact's Special Distribution
Fund.104 Not surprisingly, Davis' suggestion was ill-received by the tribes.
By mid-2003, Davis had reduced his revenue-sharing proposal to $680
million per year, but in the meantime, his political viability was fading
fast.105 Republicans and others dissatisfied with Davis' performance had
successfully initiated a fall recall election, and Hollywood actor Arnold
Schwarzenegger entered the race. 106
Schwarzenegger launched a series of attacks on tribal casinos during
his campaign, criticizing California's gaming tribes for being "special
interests" who should "pay their fair share," which he estimated as similar
to Connecticut's twenty-five percent take of the Pequots' and Mohegans'
slot revenues, to help reduce the state's enormous budget deficit.107 In
California, a quarter of tribal gaming revenue could amount to more than $1
billion in annual payments to the state. Davis lost the recall election, and
Schwarzenegger became the new governor of California. Schwarzenegger
soon sought to renegotiate compacts that would have been in effect for
twenty years with a few tribes.108  At the time of this writing,
Schwarzenegger and five tribes had reached agreements in renegotiating
their compacts.109 The new compacts remove the existing limit on the
number of slot machines in exchange for increased contributions to the
state, including additional licensing fees for all new machines and sub-
stantial annual payments. 1' 0  "What's changed [since the negotiation of
103. Bailey & Rabin, supra note 102; Bunting & Morain, supra note 102.
104. Bailey & Rabin, supra note 102; Bunting & Morain, supra note 102.
105. Bailey & Rabin, supra note 102; Bunting & Morain, supra note 102.
106. Bailey & Rabin, supra note 102.
107. Louis Sahagun, The State Point Man for Gaming Tribes Is Bold Leader, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2004, at A 1; Dan Morain, Tribe's Measure Offers Tax Deal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at
Al.
108. See Morain, supra note 107, at Al. Said Schwarzenegger, "[W]e want to protect the
Indian gaming, we want to have the Indian gaming tribes pay their fair share to the state." John
M. Broder, Deal Is Near on Casinos in California, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A20.
109. Id.
110. Annual payments will be used to securitize the revenue stream in the form of bonds
issued by the State of California. In effect, this is an upfront payment to the state that will be paid
back by tribes over the life of the compact. See AMENDMENTS TO TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS
(PALA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS, PAUMA BAND OF LUISENO MISSION INDIANS OF THE PAUMA
& YUIMA RESERVATION, RUMSEY BAND OF WINTUN INDIANS, UNITED AUBURN INDIAN
COMMUNITY, AND VIEJAS BAND OF KUMEYAAY INDIANS), available a t http://
www.govemor.ca.gov/state/govsite/govhomepage.jsp (last visited Jan. 20, 2005). At the time of
this writing, the specifics of some of the new compacts were not yet finalized. See, e.g., Accord
Scales Back Casino Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2004, at A13 (reporting that negotiations
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Davis's model compact]?" asked a gaming consultant about the state's
demands for higher payments. "The state economy is in the toilet and
Indians have stuff."Ill
Schwarzenegger's announcement that he would pursue California
tribes' "fair share" of gambling revenues generated the sponsorship of
wildly divergent ballot initiatives for the fall of 2004.112 The Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians qualified a ballot initiative that would open the
door for an expansion of tribal gaming in exchange for an annual tribal
payment to the state of 8.8 percent of net casino revenues, identical to the
state's corporate income tax. 1l3 The initiative was intended to undercut the
model agreement negotiated by Schwarzenegger in mid-2004 with five
tribes in which the tribes would pay the state at least $1 billion in the first
year.114 California commercial gaming interests introduced a competing
ballot initiative that would tax tribal gaming revenue at a rate of twenty-five
percent and require tribes to submit to state law and state court jurisdiction
concerning gambling.115 If any one of the state's gaming tribes refused to
comply, the initiative would abrogate tribal exclusivity and allow sixteen
racetracks and cardrooms to operate some 30,000 slot machines, with one-
third of the revenue allocated to state and local programs.11 6 The governor
responded by forming Schwarzenegger's Committee for Fair Share Gaming
Agreements to raise funds to defeat both ballot initiatives.117
V. IMPLICATIONS
Our discussion of revenue sharing with a particular focus on recent
events in California leads us to raise several implications for the future of
such agreements in relation to the law and developing politics of Indian
gaming.
between Governor Schwarzenegger and the Lytton Band of Pomo Indians had been modified to
reduce the number of slot machines in the tribe's planned casino near Oakland).
111. Sahagun, supra note 107 (quoting Michael Lombardi).
112. Associated Press, Governor Bets on His Plan for Indian Gaming, DESERT SUN (Palm
Springs, Cal.), June 17, 2004, at http://www.thedesertsun.com/news/stories2004/state/





117. Id. California voters defeated each proposition by a wide margin. A. J. Naff, What
Passed, What Failed .... INDIAN GAMING, Dec. 2004, at 20.
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A. STATES WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS TRIBES FOR REVENUE
SHARING
The same rhetorical question raised by recent negotiations in
California, what has changed since prior compacts were negotiated, might
be posed in other states, such as Minnesota. The state's recent efforts to re-
negotiate the existing tribal-state compacts reflect the influence of negotia-
tions, particularly of revenue-sharing agreements, in other states, as well as
the highly politicized relationship between state and tribal governments.
Minnesota was the first state to sign tribal-state compacts allowing
Class III gaming, with mixed results.118 Some tribes in Minnesota, located
in the state's more rural northwest, have only modestly successful casinos
due to the constrained consumer market.119 A couple of tribes in Minne-
sota, however, have seen extensive benefits from the fifteen-year-old tribal-
state compacts since they are located near major cities.120 On the whole,
Minnesota tribes have been relatively successful; in 2003, Minnesota
ranked third in terms of Indian gaming revenue, behind only California and
Connecticut. '21
Minnesota's compacts, which remain in effect indefinitely, provided
for the tribes to cover the state's annual regulatory costs of $150,000.122 As
other states negotiate tribal revenue-sharing payments in the tens and
hundreds of millions and, depending on the ultimate outcome in California,
perhaps even billions of dollars, state leaders in Minnesota have looked to
Indian gaming to help solve the state's own budget crisis. With a projected
$185 million deficit in 2004, Governor Tim Pawlenty sought ways to
reduce the deficit without raising taxes. 123 To pressure tribes to renegotiate
the perpetual compacts, Pawlenty threatened to consider a "racino" project
at Canterbury Downs, a horseracing facility near one of the more successful
Indian gaming facilities in the state. 124 And in what some say may be a
divide-and-conquer approach, the state proposed a joint tribal-state off-
118. Minnesota House of Representatives, House Research on Indian Gaining,
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/gambind.htm (last visited Ma 14, 2005).
119. See Patricia Lopez & Dane Smith, Lure of Gambling Riches is Strong, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRIB., Feb. 8, 2004, at lB.
120. Id.
121. Indian gaming generated approximately $1.4 billion in Minnesota in 2003. MEISTER,
supra note 4, at 9, 12.
122. Patrick Howe, Pawlenty Looks for Bargaining Leverage with Tribes, DULUTH NEWS-
TRIB., Feb. 5, 2004, at http://www.duluthsuperior.com/md/duluthtfibune/7885378.htm (last
visited May 14, 2005).
123. See generally Brian Bakst, Casino Fight Adds Up to Big-Money Battle, GRAND FORKS
HERALD (N.D.), June 24, 2004, at 6B; Mark Brunswick, Gambling in Minnesota: A New Deal?,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Mar. 28, 2004, at IA.
124. Brunswick, supra note 123.
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reservation casino venture with three tribes. One proposed location for the
jointly owned casino was near the Twin Cities' infamous Mall of America,
which already attracts some 42 million visitors each year, 2 5 and would
likely create direct competition for at least some existing Indian gaming
facilities. Whether Minnesota ultimately will be successful in its demands
for revenue sharing remains to be seen. One thing seems certain, however:
as in Minnesota and California, states likely will attempt to acquire a share
of Indian gaming revenue as they negotiate new compacts or renegotiate
existing ones.
B. NEW PERMUTATIONS OF REVENUE-SHARING AGREEMENTS WILL
ARISE
In the absence of federal action to clarify what is permissible, whether
through congressional amendment of IGRA to provide guidelines for the
negotiation and realization of revenue-sharing agreements, or through a for-
mal legislative ruling by the Secretary of the Interior regarding the legality
of revenue sharing under IGRA's existing provisions, 26 new permutations
of revenue-sharing agreements will continue to arise on a case-by-case
basis, contingent on the economic and political circumstances particular to
a given situation.
Connecticut law prohibits casino-style gaming and slot machines by
commercial gaming interests. 127 Thus, the tribes' operation of casino gam-
ing benefits from a relatively high level of exclusivity. As legal scholar
Kevin Washburn described it, in states with restrictive gaming laws, tribal
casinos can be "islands of gaming permissiveness in an ocean of gaming
intolerance," 28 thus attaching a significant value to the state's agreement to
maintain tribal exclusivity over casino-style gaming.
But other states have offered less than total or absolute exclusivity over
casino-style gaming in exchange for revenue sharing. 129 In Massachusetts,
for example, the state has agreed to limit, but not prohibit, commercial
casino gambling in exchange for annual payments of $90 million from the
Wampanoag Tribe's planned casino.130 The Interior Secretary's position on
125. Mall of America, Mall Information: Leasing, http://www.mallofamerica.com/
about the mall/leasing.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
126. See Contreras, supra note 52, at 510-11.
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-278a (West 2001).
128. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 NEV. L.J. 285,
294 (2004).
129. See Contreras, supra note 52, at 496-97 (using the terms "absolute" and "qualified" to
describe the differing levels of exclusivity in current revenue-sharing agreements).
130. Id. at 496-97.
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revenue sharing appears to allow a state to offer a tribe less than total
exclusivity, but just how much less is not clear.131 With revenue sharing
occupying a decidedly gray area of the law, it seems likely that in nego-
tiating such agreements, states will push the envelope on how much they
should get in return for granting tribes absolute or more limited exclusivity.
Some tribes may be willing to agree to pay the states higher percentages of
gaming revenue in return for absolute exclusivity, or to concede to qualified
exclusivity in return for a successfully negotiated compact.
C. CALIFORNIA MAY SET THE NEW REVENUE-SHARING
BENCHMARK
The decade-old experiences of tribes and the state of Connecticut
continue to pave the way for the future of tribal-state revenue sharing.
While the revenue-sharing agreements negotiated first by the Pequots and
then by the Mohegans obviously have been extremely lucrative for the
tribes, Connecticut's willingness to "give up" absolute exclusivity to the
tribes benefited the state in three major ways: the state negotiated a then-
unprecedented twenty-five-percent share of tribal gaming revenue, the grant
of absolute exclusivity placed the state on the safest footing with the
Secretary of the Interior in its interpretation of the permissibility of revenue
sharing under IGRA, and the state managed to preserve the politically
popular appearance of opposing the expansion of legalized gambling.
Although Californians appear to favor public policy supporting gambling
more than Connecticut voters, the state is fairly typical of those with
minimal legalized gambling outside of Indian gaming facilities. In such
states, it most likely will prove politically viable for the state to use the
negotiation of revenue-sharing agreements to strike the balance between
fostering Indian gaming as a means of tribal economic development and
self-determination and controlling the spread of legalized gambling
generally.
Recent tribal-state interactions in California hint at their potential for
establishing the benchmark for the negotiation and realization of new
revenue-sharing agreements. The key shift in the developing revenue-
sharing paradigm has been the move to renegotiate existing tribal-state
compacts. By renegotiating existing compacts to pursue greater revenue
payments from tribes, the actions of the Schwarzenegger administration, as
a follow-up to prior events during the Davis regime, demonstrate how
compacts can become impermanent manifestations of changing state
131. See id. at 497-98; Lent, supra note 52, at 469-70.
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political goals rather than codified tribal-state agreements negotiated to
further common interests and in recognition of tribes' sovereign status.
D. A COOKIE-CUTIER APPROACH TO REVENUE SHARING MAY BE
SHORT-SIGHTED
Kris Olson, the chair of the Board of Trustees of Oregon's Spirit
Mountain Community Fund, recently bemoaned a "cookie-cutter approach"
to negotiating new tribal-state compacts in that state.132 A similar one-size-
fits-all approach by other states in seeking to negotiate new compacts or to
renegotiate existing compacts to institute "fair-share" agreements may con-
stitute short-sighted public policy.
First, this approach undercuts stated goals of federal Indian policy,
decreasing tribal economic development opportunities (and by extension,
those of surrounding non-tribal communities and the state) and threatening
the long-term viability of Indian gaming. The cookie-cutter approach is of
particular concern to tribes in rural locales with limited gaming markets,
such as North Dakota. Tribes in that state use their relatively modest casino
profits to fund tribal government operations and programs and to create
employment opportunities on the reservation. 133 Should the state follow
California's lead and demand a revenue-sharing agreement from the tribes,
the result could endanger the viability of the five tribal casinos in the state.
This would impact not only the tribes' ability to provide essential
government services on the reservation, but also the continued positive
economic impacts of the casinos felt both on and off the reservation. 134 The
132. Amanda Pennelly, Compacts Tie Bets to Giving, PORTLAND TRIB., Apr. 16, 2004, at
http ://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=23965 (last visited May 14, 2005).
133. See generally Kathryn R.L Rand & Steven A. Light, Raising the Stakes: Tribal
Sovereignty and Indian Gaming in North Dakota, 5 GAMING L. REV. 329 (2001) (describing
profitability and use of gaming revenue of North Dakota's tribal casinos); Rand, supra note 8.
134. See Rand & Light, Raising the Stakes, supra note 133, at 335.
Together, North Dakota's five tribal casinos have directly created more than 2,000
jobs in the state. Over eighty percent of the casino jobs are held by Native Americans,
many of whom previously were unemployed and receiving public assistance. The
casinos' total payroll exceeds $30,000,000 each year.
According to calculations using economic multipliers, the annual economic benefits to
the state resulting from the casinos' payroll top $93,000,000. Of these benefits, over
$22,000,000 accrue to the retail sector in the state, which is located primarily off the
reservations. Thus, while most employees live on or near the reservations, much of
their wages are spent off the reservation.
In addition to payroll, the state's five casinos spend over $18,000,000 on goods and
services each year. Applying economic multiplier calculations to goods and services
purchased by the casinos, the annual benefits to the state exceed $31,000,000. The
bulk of these benefits goes to the retail sector, which is located primarily off the
reservations.
[VOL. 80:657
INDIAN GAMING AND REVENUE SHARING
steady increase in tribal-state revenue sharing is "not good math on our
behalf," said J. Kurt Luger, executive director of the North Dakota and
Great Plains Indian Gaming Associations.135 "We're very concerned about
revenue sharing, especially in the Great Plains."136
Second, the cookie-cutter approach banks on Indian gaming revenue as
a short-term means to make up for state budgetary shortfalls that must be
addressed instead through long-term planning. Gambling policy is dynamic
and unpredictable; even in Connecticut, where tribal gaming has helped to
reinvigorate the state's economy, Indian gaming remains highly contro-
versial and politically charged. 137 As tribes are often cautioned, states
should be wary of overdependence on gaming profits to support their
economies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Indian gaming generates economic growth and development on
reservations as well as in surrounding non-tribal communities. For states
and localities plagued by budgetary shortfalls, tribal gaming increasingly is
perceived as a means to recoup losses or even to grow regional economies.
With the advent and growth of tribal-state revenue-sharing agreements,
tribes like those in California, Minnesota, and elsewhere increasingly are
being asked to pay their "fair share" of Indian gaming revenue.
In view of the stated long-term goals of federal Indian policy and the
law governing Indian gaming of maximizing tribal self-governance, self-
determination, and economic self-sufficiency, one might caution that short-
term revenue-sharing agreements may be negotiated at the expense of tribal
economic development and even of tribal sovereignty. Moreover, states
themselves may lose out in the long run from short-sighted public policy
driven by an overreliance on tribal gaming revenues. By contrast, recog-
nition of shared political and economic interests generated by Indian
gaming creates potential win-win outcomes for tribes and states alike.
The economic effects of North Dakota's casinos in terms of payroll and purchases,
then, benefit the state to the tune of nearly $125,000,000 each year. This makes tribal
gaming one of the state's top economic engines.
Id. at 335-36 (footnotes omitted) (citing N.D. INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, OPPORTUNITIES AND
BENEFITS OF NORTH DAKOTA TRIBALLY OWNED CASINOS (2000)).
135. Jodi Rave, Tribes' Payout to States Growing Faster than Gambling, MISSOULIAN
(Mont.), July 8, 2004, available a t http://www.missoulian.com/articIes/2004/07/O8/news/
mtregional/news08.txt (on file with the authors).
136. Id.
137. See generally Rand, supra note 8, at 60-67 (describing public debate over the
Mashantucket Pequots' Foxwoods Resort Casino in Connecticut).
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